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The Sacrificial Yoo:
Accounting for Torture in the OPR Report
*

David D. Cole

Whatever else you might say about John Yoo, the former Justice
Department lawyer who drafted several memos in 2002 authorizing the CIA
to commit torture, you have to admit that he’s not in the least embarrassed
by the condemnation of his peers. The Justice Department on February 19,
2010, released a set of previously confidential reports by its Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) excoriating Yoo’s legal work – but
stopped short of referring him for professional discipline. Immediately
thereafter, Yoo wrote op-eds for The Wall Street Journal and The
Philadelphia Inquirer trumpeting his “victory.” In The Wall Street Journal
piece, titled “My Gift to the Obama Presidency,” Yoo argued that President
Obama owes him a debt of gratitude for “winning a drawn-out fight to
protect his powers as commander in chief to wage war and keep Americans
1
safe.” Four days later, in The Philadelphia Inquirer, Yoo called the
decision not to refer him for bar discipline “a victory for the people fighting
2
the war on terror.”
This is a bit like a child coming home with an F on his report card and
telling his parents that they should congratulate him for not getting
suspended, or President Bill Clinton proclaiming to Hillary that Congress’s
failure to impeach him was a vindication of his affair with Monica
Lewinsky. The one thing practically everyone interviewed by the OPR
agreed about was that Yoo’s legal work on the torture memos was
atrocious. Bush’s Attorney General Michael Mukasey called it a “slovenly
3
mistake.” Jack Goldsmith, another Republican who headed the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2003 to 2004, said that Yoo’s August 2002
memo justifying torture by the CIA was “riddled with error” and a “one4
sided effort to eliminate any hurdles posed by the torture law.” Daniel
Levin, who headed the Office of Legal Counsel after Goldsmith left and
who, like Yoo, was a former clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas, described
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1. John Yoo, My Gift to the Obama Presidency, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2010, at A17.
2. John Yoo, Closing Arguments: Finally, an End to Justice Dept. Investigations,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 28, 2010, at C1.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION INTO THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS 9 (2009) [hereinafter OPR INVESTIGATION].
4. Id. at 160.
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his reaction upon reading Yoo’s memo as “this is insane, who wrote this?”
Steven Bradbury, acting head of the OLC after Levin’s departure, also
under President Bush, and who wrote several memos authorizing torture
himself, said of Yoo’s arguments about presidential power, “Somebody
should have exercised some adult leadership” and deleted his arguments
altogether. These are the assessments not of human rights advocates or leftwing critics but of Yoo’s own Republican colleagues at the Justice
Department.
The OPR itself, which is comprised of career civil servants charged
with monitoring ethics violations by Department lawyers and is not known
for being eager to discipline its own, decided before President Obama took
office that Yoo and Jay Bybee, Yoo’s superior, had violated their ethical
duties as attorneys. After considering responses from Yoo and Bybee, the
OPR reaffirmed that Yoo had “put his desire to accommodate the client
above his obligation to provide thorough, objective, and candid legal
6
advice, and . . . therefore committed intentional professional misconduct.”
It found that Bybee, who signed the 2002 torture memos and is now a judge
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, had acted in “reckless
7
disregard” of the same professional obligation. It recommended that both
8
lawyers be referred to their respective state bar associations for discipline.
This is about as far from vindication as one can imagine.
So how could Yoo portray this process as a victory? Only because one
Justice Department official, Associate Deputy Attorney General David
Margolis, overruled the OPR’s considered opinion. Margolis also criticized
Yoo and Bybee, finding that they exercised “poor judgment,” but he
concluded that the Justice Department should not refer them for discipline
because in his view they did not knowingly provide false advice, and
therefore were not guilty of professional misconduct. But Margolis’s
assessment was in no way an endorsement of Yoo’s theories or practices.
He described the issue of whether Yoo engaged in misconduct as a “close
question,” called the memos “an unfortunate chapter in the history of the
Office of Legal Counsel,” and said he feared that “John Yoo’s loyalty to his
own ideology and convictions clouded his view of his obligation to his
client and led him to author opinions that reflected his own extreme, albeit
9
sincerely held, views of executive power.” In short, no one who reviewed
Yoo’s work gave it a passing grade. And he narrowly escaped a referral to
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11 n.10.
DAVID MARGOLIS, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION REGARDING THE OBJECTIONS TO THE FINDINGS OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN
THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY’S REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE
OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS 67 (2010).
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his bar association for disciplinary action only because of the decision of a
single lawyer in the Justice Department.
Serious questions remain. The OPR was unable to obtain the testimony
of many high-level officials, including Attorney General John Ashcroft and
White House lawyers David Addington and Timothy Flanigan, all of whom
played critical roles in authorizing torture but refused to participate in the
inquiry.
A full-scale investigation, preferably by an independent
commission, not part of the very department implicated in the wrongdoing,
is still necessary, although the chances of such a commission being formed
seem slim.
Yet the unanimous condemnation of Yoo’s work by his peers does not
merely reflect the reality that the August 2002 memo he drafted was,
ultimately, indefensible.
The chorus of criticism is also highly
opportunistic. Yoo’s peers protest too much. By focusing attention on his
flaws, they seek to divert attention from their own subsequent approval of
the same criminal conduct. In short, Yoo’s peers seek to sacrifice him in
order to save their own skins. The OPR itself fell for this stratagem,
focusing nearly all of its attention on Yoo’s misdeeds and largely
disregarding the equally disturbing conduct of his successors at the OLC.
And by focusing on Yoo’s methods, rather than his result, the OLC failed to
confront the real failing. It was not only in Yoo’s work, but also in that of
those who, following him, authorized the CIA to engage in torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
The OPR and Margolis largely agreed that Yoo’s memos contained
many serious flaws. Yoo interpreted the ban on torture to require the
intentional infliction of severe pain of the level associated with death and
organ failure, a standard he imported from a health benefits statute having
no relevance to the issue at hand. The standard is literally meaningless, as
neither death nor organ failure is associated with any particular level of
pain. Some people die painlessly; others suffer extreme pain. The same
holds true for organ failure. Yoo appears to have adopted this gloss not to
clarify what is prohibited, but to send the message that only an
extraordinarily high degree of pain amounts to torture.
Yoo also wrote that an interrogator could inflict even that level of
severe pain as long as he did not “specifically intend” to do so. He advised
that the President could order outright torture, and that a criminal statute to
the contrary could not constrain the President as commander in chief.
(Indeed, he later told the OPR that the president could not even be
prohibited from ordering the extermination of an entire village of
10
civilians. ) And he reasoned that an interrogator who engages in torture
could defend his behavior by claiming that it was done because of
“necessity” or because it was required for self-defense – of the nation, not

10.

OPR INVESTIGATION, supra note 3, at 64.
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of the interrogator himself – even where no imminent threat is posed. Yoo
employed unprecedented and virtually unrecognizable versions of these
defenses. (The OPR report discloses that even the lawyer who worked
under Yoo on the memos initially found his argument about self-defense
“wholly implausible,” because self-defense requires an imminent threat to
11
the person invoking it, and interrogators faced no such threat. )
Where the OPR viewed these errors cumulatively as evidence of an
extraordinary and ultimately bad-faith effort to contort the law to reach a
predetermined result, Margolis principally treated the errors one by one,
and concluded that no single error “of itself” warranted a finding of
12
professional misconduct. Margolis, in short, missed the forest for the
trees.
In a more fundamental sense, however, both the OPR and Margolis
failed to confront the real wrong at issue. They focused exclusively on the
manner by which Yoo and Bybee arrived at their result, rather than the
result itself. What is most disturbing about the torture memos is not that
they employ strained reasoning or fail to cite this or that authority or
counter-argument, but that they do so in the name of authorizing torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of human beings.
Remarkably, neither the OPR nor Margolis directly considered the illegality
of the conduct that was authorized by the memos. The OPR stated that it
“did not attempt to determine and did not base our findings on whether . . .
13
[the] Memos arrived at a correct result.” Margolis also did not address
whether the conduct authorized was illegal. But surely that is the central
issue.
Why, then, did the OPR and Margolis fail to consider the legality of the
brutality itself? Almost certainly because doing so would have implicated
not only John Yoo and Jay Bybee, but all of the lawyers who approved
these methods over the five-year course of their implementation, including,
within the Justice Department, Jack Goldsmith, Daniel Levin, and Steven
Bradbury, Bybee’s successors as head of the OLC, and two Attorneys
General, John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales. When one considers that
they authorized the same illegal conduct, the criticisms offered by OLC
heads Goldsmith, Levin, and Bradbury seem designed to distance
themselves from Yoo, even as they concurred with the bottom line of the
Yoo and Bybee memos that the tactics being used by the CIA were
legitimate.
Goldsmith, for example, rescinded only one of Yoo and Bybee’s two
August 1, 2002, memos – the one that was leaked – and left in place a stillclassified memo that authorized all of the specific procedures employed by
the CIA. Goldsmith did temporarily suspend authorization of
waterboarding, but not because it was torture. He did so, he said, because
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 64 n.53.
See, e.g., MARGOLIS, supra note 9, at 43.
OPR INVESTIGATION, supra note 3, at 160.
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he believed that the CIA may have used it in ways that diverged from its
14
authorized form.
Goldsmith and Levin drafted a replacement memo for the original
torture memo. But that memo, issued in December 2004 under Levin’s
signature shortly after Goldsmith’s departure from OLC, pointedly did not
alter any of the office’s bottom-line conclusions that the CIA’s tactics were
legitimate. It used more politic rhetoric (no doubt because it was drafted
for public release, unlike Yoo’s memo), but it permitted the CIA to
continue to subject suspects to forced nudity, extended sleep deprivation,
slaps to the face and stomach, painful and extended stress positions, being
slammed into walls, and waterboarding – the very tactics Yoo and Bybee
had approved.
For his part, Bradbury wrote three memos in 2005 and one in 2007, all
of which concluded that the CIA could continue to engage in whatever
coercive tactics it requested. These memos are in some sense even more
disingenuous than the initial memos authored by Yoo and Bybee. Each of
these memos concluded, in secret, that the CIA did not need to change its
practices, despite the fact that the law, at least for public consumption, had
grown increasingly restrictive with respect to interrogation tactics. Thus,
when Congress, under Senator John McCain’s leadership and over strong
objections from President Bush and Vice-President Cheney, made clear that
it would reject the Bush administration’s view that the ban on cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment did not apply to foreigners held outside
15
our borders, Bradbury wrote two memos concluding that none of the
CIA’s tactics were cruel, inhuman, or degrading anyway – even when
inflicted in combination. This is a truly remarkable conclusion – namely,
that the CIA could deprive a suspect of sleep for days on end, repeatedly
slap him in the stomach and face, force him into painful stress positions for
hours at a time, and waterboard him, without inflicting cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. John Bellinger, who served as legal adviser to the
National Security Council and the Department of State under President
Bush, and who himself signed off on the CIA’s torture tactics in 2003, told
the OPR that this memo’s conclusion was “so contrary to the commonly
held understanding of the [anti-torture] treaty that he considered that the
memorandum was ‘written backwards’ to accommodate a desired result.”
Bradbury reached this conclusion by aggressively misreading
16
constitutional precedent. He reasoned that the relevant standard under
U.S. law for what constitutes “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” is whether
government conduct “shocks the conscience,” a due process test, because
the Senate had said as much in approving the treaty. But he then
14. Id. at 115.
15. 42 U.S.C. §2000dd (2006).
16. For a more detailed analysis of the torture memos’ strained reasoning, see DAVID
COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE (2009).
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concluded – entirely unreasonably – that the CIA tactics would not shock
the conscience for two reasons. First, CIA interrogators inflicted pain not
arbitrarily, but for a good end – to gather intelligence about terrorism.
Citing Supreme Court language stating that “the official conduct ‘most
likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level,’ is the ‘conduct intended to
17
injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest,’” Bradbury
then treated that standard as if it were the only standard for conscienceshocking behavior. Second, he reasoned that the techniques were not
arbitrary because the government sought to “minimize the risk of injury or
any suffering that does not further the Government’s interest in obtaining
18
actionable intelligence.” Significantly, however, the memo did not claim
that the CIA’s techniques sought to minimize the risk of all injury or
suffering, but only of injury or suffering “that does not further the
Government’s interest.”
The case law is clear, however, that any intentional infliction of pain
for interrogation purposes violates due process. And the Court has
recognized no sliding scale that would permit the infliction of pain if the
government’s reason is good enough.
Injurious conduct that is
“unjustifiable by any government interest” is the easiest case, to be sure, but
the Court has repeatedly found its conscience shocked where the
government acted with wholly legitimate interests.
The Court ruled, for example, that pumping a man’s stomach in a
hospital after seeing him swallow what appeared to be drugs shocked the
conscience, even though the procedure was carried out in a hospital
pursuant to safe procedures, and for a wholly legitimate purpose – to gather
19
evidence of crime. The Court has repeatedly held that any use or threat of
force to coerce a confession violates due process – even where employed to
20
And it has stated that government conduct that
solve a murder.
21
contravenes the "decencies of civilized conduct” or that is “so ‘brutal’ and
‘offensive’ that it [does] not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and
22
decency’ would violate due process.” All of these decisions point to the
same conclusion – that the deliberate infliction of pain to compel a suspect
to talk against his will shocks the conscience
In Chavez v. Martinez, the Supreme Court, in 2002, addressed whether
the interrogation of a man while he was hospitalized and suffering
substantial pain from a police shooting violated the Constitution – even
17. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (1994) (quoting County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)) (emphasis added).
18. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A.
RIZZO RE: APPLICATION OF 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A TO CERTAIN TECHNIQUES THAT MAY BE
USED IN THE INTERROGATION OF A HIGH VALUE AL QAEDA DETAINEE 31 (2005).
19. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
20. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944).
21. Rochin, supra note 19, at 172-173.
22. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957).
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though the statements were never used in a prosecution. Significantly, the
interrogating officers did not inflict any pain for the purpose of questioning,
although they did continue the interrogation despite the man’s cries of pain.
The officers maintained that the man’s testimony was critical to
investigating the encounter, and they feared that he might die, so that this
may have been their only opportunity to obtain his version of events. The
Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider whether the
questioning violated substantive due process. While the justices disagreed
about the specific conclusions to be drawn from the facts at hand, both
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who concluded that due process had been
violated, and Justice Clarence Thomas, who concluded that it had not,
agreed that the deliberate infliction of pain on an individual to compel him
to talk would shock the conscience. Justice Kennedy reasoned that police
“may not prolong or increase a suspect’s suffering against the suspect’s
will,” or even give him “the impression that severe pain will be alleviated
23
only if [he] cooperates.” Under this standard, likely to be the majority
view given Justice Kennedy’s central role on the Court, any use of pain to
compel a suspect to talk violates due process. Justice Thomas found that
due process had not been violated, but only because he found “no evidence
that Chavez acted with a purpose to harm Martinez,” or that “Chavez’s
24
conduct exacerbated Martinez’s injuries.” Under either approach, then, a
purpose to harm violates due process. The court of appeals on remand in
Chavez unanimously held that the alleged conduct indeed shocked the
25
conscience, a fact not even acknowledged by the OLC memo.
The OLC memo cites Chavez, but concludes, incredibly, that “the CIA
program is considerably less invasive or extreme than much of the conduct
26
at issue in” Chavez. In fact, just the opposite is true. The officers in
Chavez inflicted no pain for purposes of interrogation – yet three members
of the Supreme Court found their conduct conscience-shocking nonetheless,
as did the unanimous court of appeals on remand. The CIA’s entire
program, by contrast, was based on the deliberate infliction of pain and
humiliation to compel recalcitrant suspects to talk against their will.
When the Supreme Court in 2006 rejected the Bush administration’s
position that the Geneva Conventions did not protect al Qaeda and Taliban
27
detainees, Bradbury wrote yet another secret memo in 2007, this time
concluding that the CIA’s tactics did not violate the Geneva Conventions’
23. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Stevens).
24. Id. at 775 (Thomas, J., joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia).
25. Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A.
RIZZO RE: APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 16 OF THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE TO CERTAIN TECHNIQUES THAT MAY BE USED IN THE
INTERROGATION OF HIGH VALUE AL QAEDA DETAINEES 35 (2005).
27. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).
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requirement that all detainees must be treated humanely. One can be sure
that if another nation sought to deploy the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation
techniques” on U.S. prisoners of war, the United States would consider
such treatment a blatant violation of the Geneva Conventions’ guarantee of
“humane treatment.” Yet the OLC concluded otherwise, driven, it seems,
more by a desire not to undercut prior authorizations than by a desire to
arrive at the legal truth.
Margolis sought to excuse Yoo and Bybee in part on the basis of the
extraordinary circumstances in which they wrote their initial memos, within
one year after September 11. It’s not clear why this consideration should
excuse approval of torture or cruel or inhuman treatment. But that excuse is
not even conceivably available for Yoo and Bybee’s successors in the
Justice Department. They wrote their memos not in the heat of the
moment, but after the program had been in place for years, and had been the
subject of substantial criticism by the CIA’s own inspector general. The
inspector general found, among other things, no evidence that the practices
in fact obtained useful information that lawful, noncoercive tactics would
29
not have obtained.
Yet OLC lawyers continued to approve of the
practices.
Yoo and Bybee are in some sense easy targets. Their memos were the
first to be written, and they employed less polished rhetoric and less
nuanced argument than the memos that followed years later, written by
authors who had the benefit of hindsight and were aware of the public
condemnation that the initial memo had occasioned. But surely what was
wrong with all the memos, at bottom, was the legal approval of conduct
that, under any reasonable understanding of the terms, amounted to torture
or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, all of which the United States
has solemnly committed to abjure. That conclusion was apparently too
dangerous for either Margolis or the OPR, since it would have implicated
everyone who had approved the CIA interrogation program, not just Yoo
and Bybee.
In fairness, responsibility for the illegal brutality inflicted on CIA and
Guantánamo detainees cannot be restricted to Yoo and Bybee. It extends to
all those who approved the tactics – even those, like Goldsmith, Levin, and
Bradbury, who were so eager to condemn Yoo’s reasoning later. As we
recently learned from an admission in former President George W. Bush’s
memoir, Decision Points, responsibility extends even to the President

28. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A.
RIZZO RE: APPLICATION OF THE WAR CRIMES ACT, THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT, AND
COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS TO CERTAIN TECHNIQUES THAT MAY BE
USED BY THE CIA IN THE INTERROGATION OF HIGH VALUE AL QAEDA DETAINEES (2007).
29. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SPECIAL REVIEW: COUNTERTERRORISM
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES 100 (2004).
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himself. And unless we as citizens demand some form of accountability
for the wrongs done in our name, responsibility extends to all of us as well.
Margolis concluded his memo with an important caveat: “OPR’s
findings and my decision are less important than the public’s ability to
make its own judgments about these documents and to learn lessons for the
future.” In this, at least, he was exactly right. The most important question
going forward is whether the Bush administration’s decision to authorize
and practice torture and cruelty will be viewed as a necessary adjustment in
a time of severe crisis or as a morally, constitutionally, and ethically
culpable descent into illegality. The former conclusion would leave these
tactics lying around “like a loaded gun,” ready to be deployed again in
some future crisis. The latter assessment might, by contrast, provide a
check on such tactics being repeated. The failure of the OPR and Margolis
to confront the illegality of the CIA’s approved techniques constitutes a
fundamental flaw in their approach, but it does not excuse others from
doing so.
For his part, President Obama has insisted that we must look forward,
not back, and has opposed efforts to create a bipartisan commission to
investigate torture. His Justice Department has also successfully opposed
all civil lawsuits seeking compensation for those victimized by torture.
And the only criminal investigation of torture underway as of September
2009 focuses solely on the isolated acts of a few CIA interrogators who
went beyond the brutality authorized by the Justice Department’s OLC and
Bush’s Cabinet-level officials, but does not encompass those who
authorized brutality in the first place.
Without the President’s support, it is hard to see how any official
mechanism for accountability can proceed. The President’s supporters
argue that a commission would be extremely divisive, and would take time
and attention away from all the other problems that the nation faces. Even
more fundamentally, the Democrats seem to be afraid of appearing soft on
terrorism, of being labeled as caring more about the rights of suspected
terrorists than about the security of Americans.
But here, President Obama might look to the example of David
Cameron, Britain’s new Conservative Prime Minister. Cameron took office
in 2010 without garnering a majority vote, and had to forge a political
alliance with the Liberal Democrats even to assume the post of prime
minister. His political position could hardly be more tenuous. And the
United Kingdom, in the midst of a severe economic crisis, faces at least as
many grave problems as does the United States. Yet shortly after he took
office, Cameron announced an official public inquiry into allegations of
high-level British complicity in the torture of terrorism suspects, saying,
“the longer these questions remain unanswered, the bigger the stain on our
30. GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 169-170 (2010) (admitting that he personally
authorized the waterboarding of CIA detainee Khaled Sheikh Mohammed).
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reputation as a country that believes in freedom, fairness and human rights
31
grows.”
Why was Cameron able to do what Obama was not? In some measure,
it is because Britain has learned from its past. In early skirmishes with the
Irish Republican Army in the 1970s, the British responded much as the
Bush administration did after 9/11. They interned hundreds of suspects
without charges, and used torture and brutality to interrogate them –
including sleep deprivation, shackling and painful stress positions. The
tactics backfired. They created a public relations disaster for the nation and
gave the IRA its most potent recruiting tool.
But Britain’s leaders did not insist that they must look forward, not
back. Instead, in 1971 Prime Minister Edward Heath appointed a
commission of inquiry, headed by Lord Parker, the Lord Chief Justice of
England, to look into the practice. A year later, the Parker commission
32
issued a report finding that the tactics violated domestic law. In the
United Kingdom today, there is widespread public agreement that such
tactics are never permissible. In the United States, by contrast, polls
consistently show division over whether torture may sometimes be justified.
It was only by looking backward that Britain moved forward. The
United States must do the same. Fears of political division, or of being
called “soft on terror,” cannot excuse us from acknowledging our legal and
moral wrongs. We must continue to insist on accountability, whether in
congressional hearings, citizens’ commissions, civil lawsuits, or the
marketplace of ideas. The essential lesson must be that torture and cruel
treatment are not policy options, even when a lawyers are willing to write
33
“slovenly” opinions blessing illegality.

31. Rebecca Omonira-Oyekanmi, Cameron Launches Probe into Alleged Torture of
Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 7, 2010, at A7 (quoting Cameron).
32. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed To Consider Authorised
Procedures for the Interrogation of Persons Suspected of Terrorism (1972), available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/parker.htm.
33. OPR INVESTIGATION, supra note 3, at 9.

